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Vietnamese Civic Organisations: Supporters 
of or Obstacles to Further Democratisation? 
Results from an Empirical Survey 
Jörg Wischermann, Bui The Cuong, and Dang Thi Viet  
Phuong
Abstract: In political science and in development cooperation, civic 
organisations (COs) under authoritarian rule are usually seen as support-
ers of processes that move towards democratisation. However, these 
organisations are sometimes criticised for their support of those in pow-
er. Within this context, critics refer to the fact that many COs have, for 
example, authoritarian intra-organisational structures. This characteristic 
clearly limits their potential to be supporters of democratisation process-
es. In this paper, we proceed from the assumption that Vietnamese COs 
can be both supporters of democracy and organisations that help to 
maintain authoritarian rule; they can sometimes even be both at the same 
time. COs are “polyvalent” (Kößler). More concretely, what COs are and 
which role(s) they play in the political system is mainly but not exclusive-
ly dependent on the impact the state has on them, and is at the same 
time dependent on the effects that those organisations have on the state.  
The results from an empirical survey, supported by the German Re-
search Council (2013–2016) and carried out as a co-operation between 
the Institute of Asian Studies/GIGA Hamburg and the Vietnam Acad-
emy of Social Sciences, suggest the following: 
 Most Vietnamese COs are hierarchically structured, if not organised 
in an authoritarian way. They are not “schools of democracy”, in 
the sense of Tocqueville. 
 Most Vietnamese COs that have engaged in the welfare provision 
sector, either willingly or unwillingly, have helped to foster the 
foundations of authoritarianism. 
 In the field of economic policies, the COs invited by the state to 
participate in and contribute to the formulation of policies do help, 
overall, to secure existing power structures, even though these or-
ganisations also help change various economic policies and even 
though their activities produce some democracy-promoting effects. 
 In the policy field of gender equality, women’s rights, and rights of 
sexual minorities, the mass organisation Vietnam Women’s Union 
supports the state’s respective discourse. Some NGOs active in this 
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policy field are doing both: They support and criticise the state’s dis-
course on gender norms and the rights of sexual minorities.  
In the conclusion, we answer the question of which Vietnamese COs can 
be seen as supporters of further democratisation and which can be classi-
fied as obstacles.  
  Manuscript received 31 May 2016; accepted 24 July 2016 
Keywords: Vietnam, civic organisations, authoritarianism, democratisa-
tion 
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Introduction 
What civic organisations (COs) are and what role they play in different 
political systems is the subject of a longstanding and controversial debate. 
Some views are based on those of the French political thinker and histo-
rian Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) and see such organisations as 
“schools of democracy” or even “bulwarks of democracy” (Hyden 2010: 
253). However, there has also been a lot of criticism of such views, like 
the one Edwards and Foley (1996) or Roth (2004) articulated. Those 
authors warned of “dark sides” of COs, since many COs show features 
of authoritarianism as regards intra-organisational decision-making pro-
cesses. Others have turned Tocqueville’s positions upside down and 
claimed that COs are supporters of autocracies. In Egypt, for example, 
members of social movements articulated such critiques vis-à-vis COs 
during the uprising there in 2011. Their critiques echoed comments 
about the worldwide “NGOization” of COs (Carroll and Sapinski 2015: 
3f.). According to this view, many COs (especially NGOs) have devel-
oped into policy experts and/or service providers since the 1980s. In 
former days, such organisations had denounced conservative societies 
and authoritarian rule. Over time, however, due to their closeness to the 
state and to national and international donors, those organisations lost 
most or even all of their critical impetus (Bebbington, Hickey, and Mitlin 
2008; Glasius and Ishkanian 2014).  
Regarding the case of Vietnam, we find two main positions among 
scholars. On one hand, there are claims that COs, especially local NGOs 
working as service providers, are apolitical and closely related to, if not 
befriended with, the state (Thayer 2009; Wischermann et al. 2015: 28). In 
contrast, Bui Hai Thiem (2013) saw Vietnamese COs as contesting pow-
er and representing ideas and values in governance about democratic 
freedoms, transparency, accountability, and meaningful participation. In 
his view, COs “serve as fundamental platforms for the changing dynam-
ics of governance in Vietnam” (Bui 2013: 93). 
Cavatorta (2013) offered a way out of the controversy between 
those who see COs as fighters for democracy and those who view COs 
as organisations that help to preserve authoritarian rule. Cavatorta sug-
gested shedding teleological thinking and giving up any normative pre-
sumptions. In this context, he recommended joining Berman (2006), 
who proposed that COs  
should not be considered an undisputed good, but a politically 
neutral multiplier – neither inherently “good” nor “bad”, but ra-
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ther as being dependent on the wider political environment and 
the values of those who control it. (Berman 2006: 266) 
Finally, Cavatorta (2013) suggested conceptualising the relationship be-
tween (an authoritarian) state and society as an interdependency and 
proposed exploring COs and their activities in relational ways (Cavatorta 
2014: 3). His idea takes account of the argument that whatever “political 
environment” might influence COs, these organisations are also part of 
this environment and influence it. Thus, when examining relationships of 
state-COs, relational thinking helps to avoid tautologies. Viewed in this 
way, relational thinking paves the way towards the development of a new 
research agenda.  
Part of such a new research agenda is a larger, cross-regional project 
based at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and 
funded by the German Research Council (KO 3513/5-1).1 This project 
was carried out in close co-operation with the Vietnam Academy of 
Social Sciences (VASS), among others, and was completed in April 2016. 
The present paper analyses Vietnam-related data from this survey. The 
project investigated whether COs support and/or weaken authoritarian 
state power, using three post-socialist countries (Algeria, Mozambique 
and Vietnam) as examples.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first de-
scribe the theoretical framework of the survey, then address methodo-
logical issues, and then present the most important Vietnam-related 
empirical findings. In the penultimate section, we discuss in detail the 
conclusions that can be drawn from these findings regarding the ques-
tion of which COs in Vietnam, if any, are supporters of and/or obstacles 
to further democratisation. The concluding section presents a short 
summary of the main findings and an answer to the above question. 
Theoretical Framework 
This research project contains a basic assumption that recurs not only on 
functionalist theoretical approaches and concepts, but also on funda-
mentals of relational sociology. This assumption is that what COs are, 
what they are doing, what they are capable of delivering, and which 
role(s) they might play in the respective political system are all dependent 
on the impact conditioning factors have on them, but also dependent on 
                                                 
1  For further information on this project, see <www.giga-hamburg.de/en/pro 
ject/civil-society-organizations-as-supporters-of-authoritarian-rule-a-cross-regio 
nal-comparison> (1 August 2016). 
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the effects that those organisations have on those conditioning factors. 
COs can be bulwarks of democracy, supporters of autocracies, and even 
both at the same time; in other words, COs are “polyvalent” (Kößler 
1994). 
In the empirical sections of this paper, we show what kind of im-
pact the state (as the most important conditioning factor) has on Viet-
namese COs and what impact COs have on the state. More precisely, we 
examine what impact two particular forms of state power have on COs 
and the kind of impact COs have on those two forms of state power. 
These forms of power are:  
 Infrastructural power, which denotes the “logistics of political con-
trol” (Mann 1984: 192) in general, and two specific forms of such 
control, namely “control through welfare provision” and “control 
through limited participation”.  
 Discursive power, which we understand as the “power employed by 
agents of the state through/on discourse” (Göbel 2011: 188, fn 7), 
and thus the exertion of power through controlling the societal dis-
course and shaping the understanding of societal or political issues, 
historical events, and so on.  
In the research project, we analysed those interdependent and reciprocal-
ly influential relations between COs and four forms of state power in 
four areas.  
The first area was intra-organisational decision-making. We chose 
this issue because, assuming that the state wants to exert control of the 
society in general and of COs in particular, it might try to influence those 
organisations’ decision-making processes. This could happen, for exam-
ple, regarding activities and the selection of leading personnel. COs may 
or may not deny that the state impacts their intra-organisational decision-
making processes.  
Second, from a theoretical perspective, we assume that the state 
aims to exert control over the society by providing welfare services, and 
that in this respect the state utilises COs. COs can be very helpful in 
terms of reaching specific groups of vulnerable and disadvantaged peo-
ple living in urban ‘problem areas’. However, the state also aims to main-
tain a very significant role in this policy field. Therefore, we examine the 
role of the state in this field, COs’ positions vis-à-vis this role, and 
whether associations do support and/or offer (which) criticism and al-
ternatives to (which) state policies and practices in this policy field. In 
other words, we explore whether and to what extent the state exerts 
‘control through welfare provision’, and how COs react to these at-
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tempts. We have chosen the policy field of HIV/AIDS prevention and 
care of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHIV). Our choice is based 
on the fact that the AIDS pandemic became a nation-threatening risk in 
the early 2000s and rulers of many states, even those under authoritarian 
rule, decided that something had to be done to reduce the further spread 
of the disease, which at that time had reached the ‘middle of the society’ 
in many countries. It is safe to assume that rulers also foresaw negative 
consequences for themselves if they did not take action. These rulers 
have given COs a role in the fight against HIV/AIDS.  
Third, we turn to the issue of economic policies, especially the 
promotion of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This policy 
field contains active social strata (parts of the so-called middle class) that 
might be seen as a potential threat to those in power and that have close 
relations with, for example, state-owned or at least state-controlled en-
terprises. We assume that the state invites carefully selected COs repre-
senting specific social strata to participate in policy formulation and 
decision-making processes in the National Assembly. However, these 
COs are kept away from those places where the ‘real’ decisions are made 
(such as the Vietnam Communist Party’s Central Committee or its Polit-
buro). Thus, what takes place is ‘control through limited participation’. 
We examine whether COs have been co-opted by the state, and if so, 
which ones; which mechanisms have been used in order to reach this 
goal; whether and how COs have defied those offers; and what follows 
from the respective options actors have chosen to pursue.2  
Fourth, we turn to the issues of gender equality, women’s rights and 
the rights of sexual minorities. The exertion of discursive power by the 
state in the form of a sustained influence on gender norms and gender 
relationships is not at all coincidental, because gender is:  
a central component in the field of state hegemony, since state 
discourses produce hegemonic masculinity and gender hierarchy. 
[…] Conversely, the state develops out of gender relationships. 
State and gender are reciprocally constitutive discursive for-
mations with respectively specific ways of interaction and institu-
tionalization. (Sauer 2001: 166f. Our translation.) 
We examine whether COs support the state discourse and state’s policies 
in this field and/or whether they offer criticism of this discourse, and 
                                                 
2  “Cooptation [is …] the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership 
or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting 
threats to its stability or existence. […] Cooptation may be formal or informal, 
depending on the specific problem to be solved” (Selznick 1949: 13). 
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which critique of and alternatives to this discourse and which state’s 
policies they develop.  
It is possible to draw conclusions from the empirical findings re-
garding whether Vietnamese COs can be labelled as supporters of or 
obstacles to further democratisation and, if so, which ones. Here, we 
start from the assumption that collective and individual self-determ-
ination and autonomy are at the core of what democracy is about. More 
specifically, autonomy is the fundamental democratic ideal of a delibera-
tive understanding of democracy and  
describes the essential meaning of democratic self-rule. […] Au-
tonomy means that individuals – both individually and collectively 
– hold their interests with due consideration, and are able to pro-
vide reasons for holding them. (Warren 2001: 62)3  
Accordingly, in the area of intra-organisational decision-making and the 
three policy fields named above we explore whether, in a general sense, 
COs support the development of citizens’ individual and collective self-
determination and autonomy and/or whether they stand for the negation 
of such self-determination and autonomy – a state of affairs that is at the 
core of authoritarianism.  
With regard to our understanding of authoritarianism, we follow 
Stenner’s definition, which says that authoritarianism repudiates individ-
ual self-determination and autonomy and strictly negates the supremacy 
of the individual over a group or a system. Authoritarianism is an en-
semble of attitudes and ways of acting that link the uncompromising 
denial of difference and diversity with an unconditioned demand for 
homogeneity and uniformity. This, in turn, leads to coercive action to-
wards and suppression of people who are “different” (Stenner 2005: 16–
20).  
Based on this understanding, the following four patterns of authori-
tarianism are critical to our assessment of the interviewed COs’ qualities 
and matters such as the examination of intra-organisational decision-
making processes: 
 A lack of tolerance of others, of views that diverge from one’s and 
the group’s own, and a strict rejection of pluralism. 
                                                 
3  “Autonomy in its individual dimension has nothing to do with separateness, 
anomie, individualism, or even self-sufficiency. Rather it has to do with indi-
viduals’ capacities to take part in critical examinations of self and others, to par-
ticipate in reasoning processes, and to arrive at judgements they can defend in 
public argument – capacities that are, in the end, delicate and valuable social 
and political achievements” (Warren 2001: 63).  
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 A rejection of difference and an insistence on sameness and prioriti-
sation of the group over the individual, as well as group interests 
over those of the individual (“groupiness”).  
 Personal coercion of and bias against people who are “different” 
(ethnically, politically, morally), as well as political demands for au-
thoritative constraints on their behaviour (that is, forms of state co-
ercion). 
 Structures and mechanisms that ensure prioritisation of the group 
over the individual, as well as group interests over those of the indi-
vidual. Such structures and mechanisms are accepted because they 
help to achieve uniformity, or are even actively supported because 
they are thought of as prudent principles for guiding social and po-
litical development (Stenner 2005: 14–20). 
A list of various democracy-promoting effects that COs might produce 
helps us to identify such effects. The most important of these are devel-
opmental effects (for example, the development of general individual 
political skills and attitudes such as public speaking); public sphere ef-
fects (for example, exertion of influence on public opinion in various 
ways); and institutional effects (such as representation of interests or 
resistance to planned or made decisions) (Warren 2001: 142–205).  
In our understanding of COs, we differentiate between a more gen-
eral, theoretical view and a more concrete, research-related view. From a 
theoretical point of view, we understand COs as part of the whole socie-
tal-political complex and of societal conflicts, all of which constitute the 
state. This understanding includes the realisation that COs are them-
selves the site of societal conflicts, are part of specific practices of state 
power exertion, and can therefore also contribute to the maintenance of 
state power. However, they can also change these practices, insofar as 
their actions are not one-sidedly and mechanistically determined by the 
economic base because states are “constantly contested projects” and 
because a (capitalist) “state per se is characterised by compromise” (Sau-
er 2011: 134; our translation). For this reason, there is at least a chance of 
“changing and transforming the class and gender relationships” (Sauer 
2011: 134; our translation).  
From a more concrete research-related point of view, we use the 
term ‘civic organisation’ as a generic term that encompasses a whole 
array of various societal organisations: mass organisations (such as the 
Vietnam Women’s Union), professionals’ organisations (for example, the 
Vietnam Economic Association), business organisations (for example, 
the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industries, VCCI), NGOs 
(such as the Institute for Studies of Society, Economy and Environment, 
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iSEE, based in Hanoi), and faith-based organisations (for example, the 
Mai Linh Shelter, based in Ho Chi Minh City). In our survey, we did not 
include ‘voluntary associations’. These organisations are very popular in 
the rural areas of Vietnam. Most of the voluntary associations have no 
legal status and see themselves as apolitical (Dang Thi Viet Phuong 
2015).  
There are several reasons for choosing the term civic organisations 
instead of civil society organisations. First, the former does not imply 
any assumption about the civil society likeness and/or whether COs 
have civil society action-like qualities (for this approach, see Wischer-
mann 2010 and 2011). In a way, it remains debatable whether the term 
civil society organisations can be applied to societal organisations in 
Vietnam and, if so, which ones. By using the term ‘civic organisation’ we 
avoid taking sides in this discussion. Second, the term civic organisation 
does not have a ‘democratic’ connotation, or any other connotation, and 
since our approach is fundamentally open to various developments (COs 
can be supporters of democracy and/or autocracies), it is much more 
appropriate to use this term. Third, the term civic organisation is politi-
cally neutral, which helps enable empirical research in this field in Vi-
etnam. Fourth, the term civic organisation and the classification of Viet-
namese COs that we use (differentiating between mass organisations, 
professionals’ organisations, business organisations, NGOs, and faith-
based organisations) is built on empirical research that our team carried 
out in three subsequent surveys (between 1999 and 2015), exploring the 
political roles such organisations play, and has proven its theoretical and 
empirical usefulness.  
Methodological Considerations 
The research proceeded in two waves. Researchers from VASS (Bui The 
Cuong led the Vietnamese research team comprising Nguyen Quang 
Vinh, Dang Thi Viet Phuong, and Nguyen Thi Minh Chau) interviewed 
representatives from 21 COs of various types based in Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City. We selected these 21 COs using the typical case sampling 
method and confined our research to these two cities because it is only 
there that we find the whole spectrum of CO types. In both cities, the 
same interview guidelines were used. In the first part of the survey, we 
explored the impact the state and other conditioning factors have on 
various types of COs. Twenty semi-structured interviews were conduct-
ed between 17 June and 15 August 2014. The second phase consisted of 
analysing what impact various types of COs have on various forms of 
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state power. In this phase we focussed on nine COs that had been inter-
viewed during phase 1 of the survey, and supplemented the sample with 
one case (NGO 5). The 10 interviews of this phase were carried out 
between 10 February and 27 April 2015. Interviewers wrote reports in 
Vietnamese, which were translated into English. All citations in the next 
sections of this paper are citations from these (translated) reports. For 
obvious reasons, we have anonymised the names of the interviewed 
organisations and the names of their representatives. The appendix con-
tains a list of all interviewed COs. 
Methodically speaking, a fair amount of “process tracing” takes 
place within this case study. In the sense of “causal process observations” 
and “process tracing per se,” with “dense description” as the prerequisite 
(in the sense of Collier 2011: 823), we explore and identify the impact 
various forms of state power have on various types of COs and vice 
versa. The qualities of COs that promote authoritarianism or that pro-
mote democracy are identified through “pattern matching” and are de-
duced from the two criteria catalogues (see above).  
Main Findings 
Before we start the presentation of the main findings, a brief explanation 
of Vietnam’s political system may be beneficial for some readers. Essen-
tially, Vietnam is an authoritarian one-party state.4 Since re-unification in 
1975/1976, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has ruled the coun-
try alone and has not tolerated any organised opposition. In name, Vi-
etnam is a socialist republic. Epitomising the socialist orientation is the 
state sector, which, according to the 2013 constitution, plays the leading 
role in the economy. Another essential characteristic of this “socialist 
orientation” is the mechanisms and principles defining the functioning 
of the state apparatus. Here, the Marxist-Leninist mechanism of “demo-
cratic centralism”, enshrined in the 2013 constitution, stands out. The 
policy of renovation (Doi Moi), approved at the sixth party congress in 
1986, is largely confined to economic reforms. To date there has been no 
transition to a more democratic and pluralistic form of rule.  
                                                 
4  We understand authoritarian political system as “political systems with limited, 
not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but 
with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor political mobilization, except 
at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a 
small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually pre-
dictable one” (Linz 2000: 159). 
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COs and Infrastructural Power in General 
In general, infrastructural power has a strong impact on all types of COs. 
We found, first, that the interviewees from various mass organisations, 
professionals’ organisations and business organisations adhere to and 
apply various principles of democratic centralism. This implies, for ex-
ample, that a small group of people or even a single person makes prior 
decisions; that the principle of “collective leadership, individual respon-
sibility” is abided by; and that after a vote the minority must follow the 
opinion of the majority. Second, we found that these organisations are 
either directly or indirectly under the “leadership of the Party” and are 
firmly and solidly integrated into the political-administrative system of 
the Party and the state. The Communist Party – more precisely, some 
key figures in the Party cells in these organisations – has/have the final 
say in all aspects concerning the “human resources” of the respective 
organisations and the activities they pursue. Third, even some NGOs 
apply certain principles related to the State’s and the Communist Party’s 
organising principle of democratic centralism. What makes things even 
more remarkable is that these organisations’ representatives (at least 
those we interviewed) seem to believe in the usefulness of such princi-
ples. There is no discernible difference between decision making in the 
Communist Party, the state and COs when it comes to the application of 
another principle related to democratic centralism – that which says that 
the minority follows the opinion of the majority after a decisive vote: 
“Once consensus is reached, everyone must be committed to follow. If 
someone is not satisfied, he/she must still ‘follow the masses’ [the collec-
tive strength].”5 Almost all of the interviewed representatives of COs felt 
that reaching consensus was the ultimate goal of decision-making pro-
cesses. 
Finally, in general terms, almost all of the interviewed COs are hier-
archically structured and their internal decision-making processes follow 
a top-down model. Here, mass organisations, professionals’ organisa-
tions and business organisations stand out. However, most NGOs also 
have a “Direktoratsverfassung” (directorate’s constitution, a term used 
for the French Constitution of 1795: ‘la Constitution de Directorate’). In 
those organisations, the director and/or the board of directors is the 
most powerful body; these people make the most important decisions.  
However, in terms of intra-organisational authoritarianism there are 
“outliers”; an example is NGO 5, based in Hanoi. This organisation does 
not seem to bow to the power of the Vietnamese state, the Communist 
                                                 
5  This statement came from an NGO 4 representative. 
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Party, and the organisational principles related to state and Party. Suffice 
it to mention the experiments at this NGO with the “acting director 
regime” and the idea and practice of “project holders”, both mechanisms 
that seem suited to weakening at least some forms of intra-organisational 
authoritarianism. In a similar way, one can at least assume that, in NGO 
1, “the opinion of the expert is considered to weigh more than the opin-
ion of the manager.” 
NGO 5 started the “acting director regime” in 2014 when it was in 
the process of a leadership transition. The founder and long-time direc-
tor resigned in July 2015. The directorship was handed over to a succes-
sor who had filled the position of an “acting director” on two separate 
occasions. In order to get staff used to such a replacement, since late 
2013 NGO 5 encouraged its staff:  
to self-nominate for the position of the acting director for a three-
month term. The goal is for people to have the opportunity to 
learn to operate and lead the organisation, and at the same time, to 
get acquainted with having a new director and still being able to 
maintain the organisation’s culture. 
The second innovation concerns the position of the project leader. This 
position rotates among members of the organisation. Additionally, “ac-
cepting the position of project manager is not synonymous with higher 
wages, instead, it is considered a management experience learning pro-
cess.” 
Members of NGO 1, which is based in Ho Chi Minh City, claim 
that in terms of decisions a more “functional” approach is taken and that 
their rather hierarchical decision-making process in practice is softened 
by functional imperatives.  
NGO 1 has a functional outline, called functional matrix in every 
field: project, personnel, finance […]. There are three levels: right 
to participate in, right to consult, right to participate in and to 
make decisions. […] In each project, we have a separate frame-
work of management and operation to allot specific tasks. Some-
times the director becomes a junior, while the director of a project 
has the highest position. 
What seems undeniable is that mass organisations, professionals’ organi-
sations and business organisations (at least those we interviewed) are 
integrated in one way or another into the specific system of rule the CPV 
has erected. In those COs where there are Party cells, the Communist 
Party has a decisive voice in terms of decisions concerning the selection 
of personnel, and at least an important say in terms of activities chosen.  
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COs and Infrastructural Power Called “Control through 
Welfare Provision” 
The form of infrastructural power we call “control through welfare pro-
vision” also has a strong impact on COs. To varying extents, the in-
volvement of COs in state programs (and, thus, their dependency on 
state funding) impacts the activities these organisations undertake, as 
well as the selection of the social groups these COs cater to. On the 
occasions when the state assigns single tasks to these organisations, it 
usually also supplies them with the budget to fulfil the tasks. Only one of 
the interviewed NGOs (NGO 2, based in Ho Chi Minh City) is integrat-
ed into a state-funded programme, called the National Targeted Pro-
gramme. The state’s strong impact on such NGOs is detectable in an 
NGO 2 representative’s explanations.  
The representative stressed that it is necessary to have a close rela-
tionship with the state apparatus, namely Ho Chi Minh City’s AIDS 
Prevention Committee: This is necessary because this Committee “assists 
us to look for sponsorship.” As a matter of fact this Committee decides 
whether a project or a program is “essential”, as the interviewee puts it. 
If the Committee is of the opinion that the project or program is not 
essential “we won’t receive the support.” NGO 2 accepts the decision of 
the (local) state’s agency. 
Examining the potential impact that COs have on the state and this 
form of state power, it is striking that the (interviewed) NGOs and the 
(interviewed) business organisation accept and act strictly within the 
authoritarian and authoritarianism-promoting state-determined political 
structures and rules. Furthermore, these organisations support the state’s 
welfare policies (at least in the field of HIV/AIDS prevention, on which 
we focussed).6 The interviewed COs neither question nor criticise the 
                                                 
6  It makes sense to focus on this policy field and the situation of PLWHIV 
because it is here that the Vietnamese government in the late 1990s and early 
2000s faced a severe crisis as the pandemic spread. Thus, this policy field be-
came very important to the state and the party. Moreover, it is here that we can 
observe a remarkable U-turn on the part of the state and the CPV. From de-
nouncing PLWHIV as (related to) ‘social evils’ in the 1990s, state and party in 
2005 shifted policies to enacting a law that stipulated that PLWHIV have ‘im-
prescriptible rights’ and should be treated without any stigmatisation and dis-
crimination at their workplace, in institutions of health care, and in schools. 
Sanctions were put in place against offenders of such rules and regulations. 
This complete turnaround was supported by many stakeholders in and outside 
the party and the state; for example, the National AIDS Committee, members 
of the Committee on Social Affairs of the National Assembly and the Ministry 
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existing political structures and rules (at least not openly and not in the 
interviews), nor do they question or criticise the policies the state stands 
for and/or has once pursued. Moreover, COs contribute to the wide-
spread perception of the Vietnamese state as the most important actor in 
this policy field and the one who pulls the strings and keeps the AIDS 
pandemic at bay.  
In terms of welfare policies, COs of various types help to fill the 
gap that the state intentionally or unintentionally leaves. COs provide 
services for people such as PLWHIV, sex workers, men who have sex 
with men (MSM) and others whom the state is not able and/or not will-
ing to reach and to provide with services. Thus, COs relieve the state’s 
burden. However, COs do not question and/or criticise (at least not 
openly and not in the interviews) the gap that the state intentionally or 
unintentionally leaves in terms of social welfare for various social groups.  
COs contribute to the widespread perception of the Vietnamese 
state as the most important actor in this policy field. They do not criticise 
the discrepancy between the position the state claims and, for example, 
the support for and funding of various activities, not only COs’, in the 
field of prevention of and care for PLWHIV. Here, the lack of state 
funding for activities of NGOs in this policy field stands out. 
Insofar as some NGOs support the development of citizens’ indi-
vidual and collective self-determination and autonomy, and insofar as 
they help to present alternatives to the dominant politics and policies, 
such activities support further democratisation. However, interviewed 
COs’ representatives made it clear that if and insofar as they pursue such 
activities, they do so in an indirect way and without explicitly criticising 
any state politics and policies. Here, the statement from NGO 1’s repre-
sentative is instructive. Initially the representative rejects the idea that 
this CO, for example, uses a rights-based approach. In practice, however, 
NGO 1 would apply such an approach. However:  
                                                                                                    
of Labour, Invalid and Social Affairs. Furthermore, international donors played 
a crucial role. However, the turnaround was finally achieved when the Central 
Ideology and Culture Department of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam in 2005 issued Directive No. 54-CT/TW. In this directive 
(which did not mention the term ‘social evils’ or that idea) the party committee, 
amongst others, explicitly suggested that the state should develop measures to 
‘prevent stigma and discrimination towards PLWHA’. This complete turna-
round from all former positions was precipitated and supported by a close co-
operation between the Central Committee’s National Ideology and Culture 
Department and experts from local NGOs. For details, see Wischermann (2011: 
400–405). 
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we do not call it rights-based approach, although in fact it is that. 
NGO 1 always regards the rights as the base to assist our activities 
[…] but NGO 1 does not call it rights-based, because this is very 
rude. 
They also pursue the aim of self-empowerment of PLWHIV and other 
social minority members:  
NGO 1 enhances […] self-empowerment. […] I think we do all 
we can for clients, including immigrant workers in factories, pa-
tients and sex-workers, who are put in the centre in projects relat-
ed to HIV/AIDS. 
However, the interviewee also stressed that, in discussions with state 
officials,  
NGO 1 does not want to put the state agencies as well as target 
groups on the opposite side. We must stay on the same side. […] 
If a state agency, the police, or any other organization opposes, we 
will invite them to participate in the discussion, at which we will 
share ideas, opinions, and will communicate and listen to each 
other in order to achieve mutual understanding. We all should 
look in the same direction. If the way of criticism is not smart, it 
will lead to confrontation. […] All methods we have used are crit-
ical in nature, but we never use that word. In the context of pre-
sent politics, I do not want to put NGO 1 at risk. 
COs and Infrastructural Power Called “Control through 
Limited Participation” 
Analysing the impact that infrastructural power called “control through 
limited participation” has on COs, it is noticeable that there is an intense 
cooperation between the state and certain professionals’ organisations 
and business organisations. It seems that this cooperation that the state 
supports mainly, but not exclusively, benefits the state: the collaboration 
between these COs and the state helps to embed the state further in 
society. However, COs also benefit from the intensified cooperation in a 
way, as it helps them to improve their performance in terms of activities, 
services offered, etc. Here, a representative’s statement from Business 
Organisation 3, based in Hanoi, is instructive:  
In the consultation on state policies related to businesses and 
trade, Business Organisation 3 better communicates the needs and 
aspirations of the businesses to the state. At the same time, its par-
ticipation in the activities of the government (policy consultation, 
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trade negotiations) helps Business Organisation 3 to have access 
to and update information and policies, which in turn helps better 
serving the training courses and information provision pro-
grammes which Business Organisation 3 holds for businesses. The 
participation in the policy-making process does not only encour-
age Business Organisation 3 to perform new activities, but it helps 
Business Organisation 3 to do its current jobs better and to im-
prove the quality and reputation of the services it provides. (Busi-
ness Organisation 3 a) 
These empirical findings can be further refined when we examine the 
impact that COs such as Business Organisations 2 and 3 and Profession-
als’ Organisation 1 have on the state and on this form of state power. 
Our interviews show that those organisations not only accept the politi-
cal structures and the state’s invitation to work within those structures, 
but that they are also strongly engaged in helping to improve policies 
(especially, but not exclusively as regards the promotion of SMEs) for-
mulated and decided within those structures. Over time, these organisa-
tions have gained a favourable position in those policy formulation pro-
cesses, and the state has rewarded them for their contribution to improv-
ing policies through various means.  
In terms of support for SMEs, one of the most important activities 
of Business Organisation 3 has been its contribution to the development 
of the Law on Enterprises. The process of amending this law has been 
cumbersome and:  
has been going on for many years. Since the 1990s, Business Or-
ganisation 3 has attended the drafting processes of the Law on 
Enterprises. […] The process of making the Law was very difficult 
[…]. At that time [the 1990s; authors’ note], thinking of and ac-
cepting a private sector was difficult for state officials […] due to 
the conflicts between the deeply ingrained thinking in terms of 
“Ask-and-Give” mechanisms and the new ways of thinking in 
terms of “openness”; for example, as regards the registration of 
enterprises. […] Business Organisation 3 articulated and commu-
nicated the problems the community of enterprises had with prac-
tical constraints, which was a motivation for reform, although this 
would put more pressure on […] the Government. […] During 
three rounds of improvements [1999, 2005, 2014; authors’ note] 
Business Organisation 3 achieved a lot of improvements for the 
business community; for example, the abandonment of hundreds 
of business permits (in 2005), first changes (in 2005) and finally 
the abandonment (in 2014) of the so-called certificate of invest-
ment registration, improvements as regards regulations concerning 
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the market entry for SMEs, etc. […] in recent years […] the law 
was approved quickly and received a high degree of consensus 
[among members of the Law Editing Team and among members 
of the National Assembly; authors’ note]. The law has the consent 
of the National Assembly, especially from the Chairman of Par-
liament: a stark contrast to the difficult situation that existed in 
2000 and 2005. 
All in all, Business Organisation 3 has “examined 16 laws, including the 
Law on Investment and the Law on Enterprises” (Business Organisation 
3 b). 
Business organisations like Business Organisation 2 and 3 and pro-
fessionals’ organisation such as Professionals’ Organisation 1 enjoy a 
favourable position within the political-administrative system. These 
organisations are involved in the final stages of decision-making process-
es taking place in the National Assembly and/or in committees and 
councils at the city level. Furthermore, since 2008 Business Organisation 
3 has been responsible for collecting the opinions of SMEs regarding 
various new laws and for transmitting these opinions to the state. Since 
2012, Business Organisation 3 has also represented the business com-
munity vis-à-vis the state in terms of transnational negotiations. Profes-
sionals’ Organisation 1, as an umbrella organisation, represents, guides, 
and leads various organisations of businessmen based in Ho Chi Minh 
City. 
The state strongly supports all three organisations. The state pays 
for the staff and the offices of Business Organisation 2 and 3 and also 
for the cars these organisations use; in the case of Professionals’ Organi-
sation 1 the state pays for the headquarters and the cars and provides 
funds for paying specialised party and managerial personnel, and also for 
administrative staff, drivers, guards, etc. (the money for the latter comes 
from state budgets for permanent activities, paid on an annual basis).  
However, the processes of policy formulation and the processes of 
decision-making are under the firm control of the Communist Party, 
which is the real decision-maker. Interviewees from Business Organisa-
tion 3 and Professionals’ Organisation 1 made it abundantly clear who 
really makes the final decisions:  
[…] the opinion of the Party leaders is the most important (Busi-
ness Organisation 3 a); because there are the Party and the Union 
present at Professionals’ Organisation 1, everything has to go 
through the Party and the Union first. […] the Party and the Un-
ion are the comprehensive leaders, so they determine the direction 
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and orientation, both for human resources and activities (Profes-
sionals’ Organisation 1).7 
COs and Discursive Power
Gender equality and women’s rights are essential for a socialist state and 
a communist party ruling this state. There are various ideological and 
historical reasons for this (including the general idea that women’s libera-
tion is closely tied to the struggle for socialism; that socialism implies full 
gender equality; and, in the case of Vietnam, the great significance of 
women in the fight against colonial and imperialist powers and for the 
re-unification of the country). Therefore, Vietnam’s constitution (2013) 
recognises gender equality and prohibits gender-based discrimination. 
Exploring the issue of rights of sexual minorities, and especially the dis-
cussion on marriage equality (which started in 2007/2008), is also re-
warding. This is because these issues became important to the state and 
the party since achievements on these policy fields brought benefits to 
the state (and the party). Vietnam could have been the first state in 
Southeast Asia to recognise marriage equality, and through changes in 
this policy field Vietnam aimed to improve its international reputation 
regarding its human rights records. Moreover, in terms of rights for 
sexual minorities the Vietnamese state and the CPV revised their posi-
tion, at least in a comparable way as they have done vis-à-vis PLWHIV. 
It is worth noting again that these changes occurred because of the influ-
ence exerted by actors outside the state and the party; in this case the 
social movement of LGBT and a network of COs (for details see Faludi 
2016).8 Thus, apart from more general theoretical reasons (saying that 
                                                 
7  In this context ‘union’ means the leadership of Professionals’ Organisation 1; 
that is, the Steering Committee of this organisation. This committee is the lead-
er of all business organisations that are members of Professionals’ Organisation 
1. Of course, the Party leads this steering committee. Therefore, the interview-
ee says that the Party and the union are leading this organisation (that is, the as-
sociations whose members are organised in this association). 
8  In the 1990s, state policies and the public discourse saw homosexuality as a 
disease that was closely associated with the outbreak and spread of the AIDS 
epidemic and with crime; however, these views and related policies changed in 
the 2010s. The revision of the Marriage and Family law (enacted 2014) and the 
aim of the Vietnamese government to gain a seat in the United Nation’s Hu-
man Rights Council (achieved in 2015) opened a political opportunity for the 
LGBT movement and a network of NGOs. They used this opportunity to start 
a creative campaign that aimed to change the public’s perception of LGBT in 
the long term and achieve marriage equality in the short term: “The downplay-
ing of sexuality, the accentuation of homophilia, shared values, the strive for 
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the exertion of discursive power by the state in the form of a sustained 
influence on gender norms and gender relationships is not at all coinci-
dental, because gender is a crucial component in the field of state he-
gemony; see 2 above), the policy field of gender equality, women’s rights 
and rights of sexual minorities is important to the socialist (Vietnamese) 
state and the Communist Party, and those issues are very suitable sub-
jects for the examination of the influence state’s discursive power has on 
COs and vice versa. 
Based on our survey’s rather limited empirical foundation, we argue 
that the Vietnamese state’s discursive power in the field of gender equali-
ty, women’s rights and rights of sexual minorities is not as strong as its 
infrastructural power, and that there might be a difference in the state’s 
impact (as far as its discursive power in this policy field is concerned) on 
different types of COs – namely, some NGOs and faith-based organisa-
tions on the one hand, and mass organisations, business organisations 
and professionals’ organisations on the other.  
Most interviewees saw similarities between their organisation’s posi-
tion on gender equality and the state’s position, but only one stated that 
the state exerts a direct influence on that particular group’s conception 
of women and that the state impacts what her CO is doing in terms of 
gender equality. Other interviewees’ statements (from an NGO and from 
a faith-based organisation) clearly and openly rejected any influence of 
the state on their conception of women and their understanding of 
women’s roles in politics and society. These organisations maintain posi-
tions that are different from the party’s and the state’s positions, or at 
least imply a critical distance from the Party and the state. 
In their statements, the representatives of the Faith-based Organisa-
tion 1 in Ho Chi Minh City rejected any state influence on what they 
think and do in terms of gender equality. They referred to the principle 
that men and women are equal in every respect. Here, the sisters did see 
similarities between the state’s conception of women and the shelter’s 
conception. However, in terms of a potential state influence on what 
their organisation thinks and does, “there are only overlaps, there is no 
influence.” Another Sister added that, in her view, the Vietnamese state 
is only echoing what Catholics have believed in for centuries:  
                                                                                                    
love and happy family life became pivots of the positive image the movement 
and NGO networks attempted to build” (Faludi 2016: 93). However, the result 
of this campaign was moderate. The new Marriage and Family Law de-
criminalized same-sex marriages but did not legally acknowledge them. The ex-
tent to which changes in public perception of LGBT have been achieved re-
mains to be seen. 
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We are nuns, very open and loving, and we respect human dignity 
[…]. For those who do not know, they consider acting in a way 
based on respect for human dignity, it seems, as if this is given by 
the state, as if the state gives them light. But for us, this is normal. 
God has taught us that the sick and the women must be respected 
just like everyone else; they must not be treated with disdain. 
Therefore, the state’s idea is nothing new to us. 
The next issue is how COs impact the state and this form of state power, 
and whether which types of COs support and/or criticise the state dis-
course on and state policies in the field of gender equality, women’s 
rights and rights of sexual minorities. In this regard, the interviews sug-
gest that one part of the Vietnamese COs (Mass Organisation 3) sup-
ports the state, whereas a different part (some NGOs) support but also 
criticise the state discourse and state’s policies in this policy field. Sup-
port comes from NGOs, for example, regarding a complete ban of do-
mestic violence and that “housework is considered an income-generating 
job.” Adequate legal clauses regarding both issues have been added to 
the new Law on Marriage and Family, discussed and enacted in 2014. 
Regarding the issue of same-sex marriage however, strong differences 
have emerged based on principles between Mass Organisation 3, proba-
bly the majority of National Assembly members, state and Party repre-
sentatives, on one hand, and some NGOs on the other hand. It is here 
that fundamental differences arise regarding concepts and the fundamen-
tal understanding of gender, gender norms, and gender relations. The 
interviewed NGOs do not share Mass Organisation 3’s basically biolo-
gistic and essentialist understanding of gender, and they reject one gen-
eral type of gender system.  
The Hanoi-based NGO 4 does not intend to build a common im-
age of women:  
The image of women varies according to groups; it also varies ac-
cording to the groups that NGO 4 supports. For example, there is 
the group of women entrepreneurs, women who have been 
abused, or women who have been the victim of human trafficking. 
[In its work; authors’ note] NGO 4 identifies different outputs 
depending on the [various; authors’ note] target groups. 
The above quotation suggests that NGO 4 follows the idea, represented 
for example in feminist studies, that uses the intersectionality approach; 
that is, that there is an interplay of race, sexuality, ethnicity, ability, class, 
and gender that results in multiple dimensions of disadvantage if not 
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oppression. Thus, in NGO 4’s and potentially other NGOs’ view, there 
cannot be a common image of women.  
NGO 5 goes one step further and moves past the male–female 
gender binary. NGO 5 sees straight men and women, lesbians, gay, 
transsexuals, etc. as different, but nevertheless equal in terms of their 
rights:  
When NGO 5 talks about equality and diversity, this implies that 
differences should be respected. This also applies to gender differ-
ences; male and female, for example. However, NGO 5 sees those 
differences in its diversity, such as there are males and females, 
transgender people, lesbians, gays, straight men, etc. Thus, NGO 
5 sees differences, but such differences also exist among men […] 
and […] among women […]. Therefore, […] the idea of NGO 5 
moves past the male–female gender binary, and at the same time 
NGO 5 is looking at men and women, gay and lesbians, etc. as el-
ements of a whole. While doing so, it becomes important that eve-
ryone has a right to be treated equally. NGO 5 opinions are quite 
open and not framed by the fact that a person is male or female. 
In stark contrast to those NGOs’ rejections of a single general type of 
gender system, Mass Organisation 3, as well as probably the majority of 
National Assembly members and state and Communist Party representa-
tives, have a biologistic and essentialist understanding of gender, and 
they are strongly in favour of one general type of gender system: 
[…] people think that equality is that men and women are same. 
However, there are biological differences that determine a differ-
ence between men and women. Men have a wrong awareness of 
such differences, so they do not share the responsibility with 
women as regards the family. Women unintentionally put more 
responsibility on their shoulders. This viewpoint of women origi-
nates from the natural characteristics of female’s vocation of 
mother. (Mass Organisation 3 b) 
Mass Organisation 3’s interviewees make the same biologistic and essen-
tialist argument regarding gays and lesbians. They distinguish between 
those who have been born with one gender’s reproductive organs but 
appear to be a member of the opposite gender, and those who are abso-
lutely ‘normal’ in their reproductive organs and their appearance, but 
whose mentality is oriented towards the opposite sex (as the interviewee 
put it): “This implies that their [the latter; authors’ note] gender identity 
is determined mentally, not biologically. The population of LGBT in 
Vietnam includes both sorts of people” (Mass Organisation 3 b). The 
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interviewees of the Mass Organisation 3 suggest that only members of 
the group with “biological specifics”, if not “deviations”, are “true” gays 
or lesbians. They are suited for the institution of marriage, although the 
interviewees’ feel that the laws should not recognise this, at least not yet. 
One interviewee argued that for those who feel their gender identity 
does not match their sex, this might be just a way of living or following a 
new trend among the youth today: “Parts of the youth are excitable, they 
live according to trends” (Mass Organisation 3 b). 
Discussion of the Findings 
In what follows, we discuss the above-described empirical findings re-
garding the main question of this paper; that is, are Vietnamese COs 
supporters of and/or obstacles to further democratisation? We will an-
swer this question in the concluding section. Our respective assessments 
are based on the use of two criteria sets named above (see ‘Theoretical 
Framework’ above). Essentially, we assume that collective and individual 
self-determination and autonomy are at the core of what democracy is 
about. Authoritarianism, however, repudiates individual self-determ-
ination and autonomy and strictly negates the supremacy of the individu-
al over a group or a system. A list of four patterns of authoritarianism 
and of various democracy-promoting effects that COs might produce 
helps us to identify the respective effects. 
Concerning the interdependencies between the state’s infrastructur-
al power (in general) on intra-organisational decision-making processes 
and COs, Vietnamese COs of all types succumb to this form of infra-
structural power (in the general sense of “control of society”). Although 
this happens to a varying extent and though there are exceptions to this 
rule, most Vietnamese COs have structures and mechanisms in place, 
which ensure the prioritisation of the group and its interests over the 
individual and his or her interests. There is a certain rejection of differ-
ence and insistence and prioritisation of what can be called “groupiness” 
(for example, when they make use of the mechanism ‘minority follows 
majority’ after a decision has been made). Thus, we find an intra-organis-
ational authoritarianism. In terms of intra-organisational decision-making 
processes, some individual skills and attitudes (public speaking, for ex-
ample) and maybe some pre-civic virtues (reciprocity, trust, and self-
respect) might be acquired under such conditions, although this will hap-
pen only to a certain extent. However, knowing how and when to strike 
a compromise and the acquisition of critical thinking abilities (particular-
ly the ability to deal with conflicts and criticism) are probably not found 
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very often, if at all. This suggests that most Vietnamese COs are not 
“schools of democracy” (to use Tocqueville’s famous dictum). However, 
there are exceptions to this rule, such as NGO 5, based in Hanoi.  
With respect to the interdependencies between the infrastructural 
power of the state, which we call “control through welfare provision,” 
and COs, the empirical facts suggest that most if not all of the inter-
viewed COs not only act within the authoritarian state’s structures, but 
also refrain from articulating critique and offering alternatives to those 
politics and policies (at least openly and in the interviews). Presumably, 
this is because of the strength of this form of state power. The ac-
ceptance of structures and policies implies that COs engaged in this 
policy field generally help to support the very substance of authoritarian-
ism; that is, the negation of collective and individual self-determination 
and autonomy.  
However, some NGOs undertake carefully crafted steps to support 
PLWHIV and other people who are stigmatised in politics and society 
(such as sex workers, MSM, etc.). They make use of and practice rights-
based approaches (which put the individual at the centre) and they sup-
port those people’s self-empowerment processes. Such NGOs help to 
strengthen processes that support the development of collective and 
individual self-determination and autonomy, core elements of processes 
leading towards democratisation. These COs’ practices might help en-
gaged people, both inside and outside these organisations, to develop 
pre-civic virtues (reciprocity, trust, self-respect). These NGOs might 
even exert a certain influence on the public by emphasising the depiction 
of commonalities between ‘affected’ parties and the general public, 
thereby potentially helping to change the public’s view of ‘those people’. 
Finally, these COs might even carry out and take over roles and respon-
sibilities that enable greater participation of persons concerned (such as 
community-based organisations) and enhance state agencies’ responsive-
ness vis-à-vis affected people. However, since they undertake activities 
that might have democracy-promoting effects on the premise that they 
do not lead to any conflicts with the authorities, and since they explicitly 
do not intend ‘to put the state agencies as well as target groups on the 
opposite side’ (as an NGO 1 representative put it), such democracy-
promoting effects might be very limited, if they develop at all. 
With regard to the interdependencies between infrastructural power 
(known as ‘control through limited participation’) and COs, the initial 
empirical results are somewhat ambivalent in terms of whether business 
and professionals’ organisations (such as Business Organisation 2 and 3 
and Professionals’ Organisation 1) develop democracy promoting effects 
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or whether they help to stabilise the existing authoritarian political sys-
tem. On one hand the data analysis suggests that these organisations’ 
activities produce democracy-promoting institutional effects (such as the 
representation of certain interests or resistance to decisions, both 
planned and made), although this happens within certain limits. Fur-
thermore, those COs carry out/take over roles and responsibilities that 
enable greater participation and responsiveness. We would even assume 
that members of those selected COs develop general individual political 
skills and attitudes (such as public speaking, learning from negotiations, 
etc.), and develop pre-civic virtues such as trust and self-respect. Addi-
tionally, those COs’ activities might have some public sphere effects 
since they influence at least a certain public. Thus, these organisations 
perform activities that lead to democracy-promoting effects. 
On the other hand – and in our view, this is decisive – those activi-
ties are examples of “limited participation” (Selznick 1949), and they lead 
to the co-optation of those COs. In a general sense, the strategy of invit-
ing professionals’ and business organisations to participate in and con-
tribute to discussions of economic policies at various venues can be seen 
as part of a strategy by the state to concentrate the representation of 
certain social sectors in the hands of selected COs, which serve as mo-
nopolised channels for transmitting the demands of these social sectors 
to the state. The state uses Business Organisations 2 and 3 and Profes-
sionals’ Organisation 1 to control the representation and transmission of 
professionals’ and entrepreneurs’ demands, and to alleviate potential 
pressure that might come from those social strata. The decision about 
who should be brought into policy-determining structures and who 
should have access to venues where fundamental decisions on politics 
and policies are made is left to the ruling Party and its decision-making 
bodies. Thus, the interviewed business and professionals’ organisations 
help to legitimise decisions taken in opaque Party structures. Further-
more, through their positive engagement within the given political struc-
tures, they help to subject various business organisations (for example, 
those organised in Professionals’ Organisation 1) to decisions of the 
‘Party/State’ (as the amalgamation of the state and the Communist Party 
is called in Vietnam). In the case of Professionals’ Organisation 1, it 
might even be that these COs’ activities help to limit the room that or-
ganisations working under this umbrella have to manoeuvre, if not to 
curb their autonomy and self-determination and that of their members. 
Finally, in respect to the interdependencies between the state’s dis-
cursive power and COs in the area of gender equality, women’s rights 
and rights of sexual minorities, Mass Organisation 3 and NGOs general-
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ly support women’s collective and individual self-determination and 
autonomy. Women active in Mass Organisation 3 might develop democ-
racy-promoting qualities such as general political skills, aptitude in public 
speaking and the ability to learn from negotiations. Mass Organisation 3 
clearly influences the public through the development of specific framing 
and exerts influence on public opinion by emphasising the depiction of 
contrasts (for example, between affected women and the general public). 
Finally, this organisation represents certain interests. However, such 
democracy-promoting effects have clear limits. This is mainly, but not 
only, due to Mass Organisation 3’s biologistic and essentialist under-
standing of gender. In their representatives’ view, women’s role is un-
changeable due to biological specifics, and bodily differences determine 
that women should be caregivers, mothers, peacemaker at home, etc. 
This clearly restricts women’s self-determination and autonomy.  
Moreover, at least the interviewed representatives from Mass Or-
ganisation 3 reject equal rights for LGBT and their position vis-à-vis 
LGBT unveils patterns of authoritarianism. They show a lack of toler-
ance vis-à-vis those who diverge from their and their organisation’s view; 
show a bias against people who are ‘different’; and they reject the idea 
and practice of difference and insist on sameness. Finally, Mass Organi-
sation 3, as an integral part of the Communist Party’s system of rule, 
plays its role within this system and helps to legitimise policies and polit-
ical decisions in the policy field of gender equality, women’s rights, and 
rights of sexual minorities. These policies are made by the ‘Party/State’ 
and usually are made in an authoritarian manner. Thus, we can summa-
rise that Mass Organisation 3’s position and activities in the fields of 
gender equality, women’s rights and rights of sexual minorities are linked 
to some democracy-promoting effects, but that these effects are more 
than offset by activities that lead to the negation of women’s self-
determination and autonomy, and thus authoritarianism-preserving ef-
fects.  
The interviewed NGOs’ positions and activities in this policy field 
can be relatively clearly and consistently linked to the support of democ-
racy-promoting effects, insofar as the positions the interviewees articu-
late are thought of as supporting collective and individual self-
determination and autonomy of women. We would even be cautiously 
optimistic regarding the possibility that members of those (interviewed) 
NGOs develop some individual political skills (public speaking and 
learning from negotiations) and appropriate pre-civic virtues (reciprocity, 
trust, self-respect). Finally, it is safe, in our opinion, to assume that 
members of those interviewed NGOs have the opportunity to acquire 
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critical thinking abilities, and that those NGO’s positions and activities 
help to:  
 influence the public through the development of specific framing;  
 exert influence on public opinion by emphasising the depiction of 
contrasts (for example, through the creation of a counter-public 
discourse) and through emphasising the depiction of commonalities 
between affected parties and the general public; 
 represent certain interests;  
 show resistance to decisions planned by the ‘Party/State’. 
Conclusion 
We conclude this paper by answering the question of whether Vietnam-
ese COs could be seen as supporters of or obstacles to further democra-
tisation and, if so, which ones. The answer to this question is derived 
from the thick description above and the subsequent analysis of the 
interdependent and reciprocally influential relations between COs and 
four forms of state power in the area of intra-organisational decision-
making and three policy fields. We put the following conclusions briefly 
into the broader context of sociological and political science research on 
the role of COs in the Vietnamese and other authoritarian political sys-
tems. We stress that these concluding remarks are theses that need to be 
verified and/or falsified in further research. 
Seen from the perspective of intra-organisational decision-making 
processes, most Vietnamese COs are hierarchically structured, if not 
organised in an authoritarian way. In the sense of Tocqueville, they are 
not “schools of democracy”. There are exceptions to this rule, namely 
some NGOs, but we assume them to be a tiny minority. Thus, the re-
sults from this survey validate the findings of Wischermann (2013) and 
Wischermann et al. (2015), but also those of Hai Hong Nguyen (2014: 
154). These authors claim that Vietnamese COs have serious deficits 
regarding democratic standards in terms of intra-organisational decision-
making processes. Thus, the results of our survey could dampen the 
hopes of those who see Vietnamese COs as sites where meaningful par-
ticipative democracy is learned (e.g., Bui Hai Thiem 2013: 93).  
Most Vietnamese COs that are engaged in the welfare provision 
sector, either willingly or unwillingly, help to foster the foundations of 
authoritarianism. This means that whether they intend to or not, these 
organisations help to negate citizens’ individual and collective self-
determination and autonomy. Thus, they could be called obstacles to 
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further democratisation. However, there are NGOs that very cautiously 
undertake steps that might help the development of democracy-
promoting effects. In view of the threatening power of this form of 
infrastructural power, these COs place so many restrictions on them-
selves that they can at best be called potential supporters of further de-
mocratisation. The assumption that Vietnamese NGOs, especially those 
that deliver services to the public, are apolitical and closely related to if 
not befriended with the state (Thayer 2009; Wischermann et al. 2015: 28), 
might be true in some sense or to some extent. However, statements 
based on this assumption should be made only with further specifica-
tions.  
Business organisations and professionals’ organisations such as 
Business Organisation 2 and 3 and Professionals’ Organisation 1 are not 
agents of further democratisation. Although they help to change various 
economic policies and although their activities produce some democra-
cy-promoting effects, these organisations overall help to secure existing 
power structures and help to secure those in power. Therefore, they can 
be assessed as obstacles to further democratisation. In our view, the 
widespread assumption among modernisation theorists that the business 
organisations and organisations of professionals built by the middle class 
help to promote democracy – at least at a certain point of socio-
economic and political development of authoritarian regimes – needs 
modification. More consideration should be given to the interests that 
those organisations represent and to the fact that many authoritarian 
regimes have the means to pacify those strata and keep them under the 
state’s thumb without using force. With regard to the effectiveness of the 
means used for the integration of these organisations, various surveys on 
co-optation (such as Selznick 1949) are relevant. These surveys show 
that the pacifying effect of processes of co-optation is not confined to 
democracies, but is also highly effective in autocracies. 
In the policy field of gender equality, women’s rights, and rights of 
sexual minorities, Mass Organisation 3 can be called an obstacle to fur-
ther democratisation. Although this organisation’s positions and activi-
ties help to develop some democracy-promoting effects, these effects are 
eclipsed by that organisation’s fundamental understanding of gender, its 
position of principle regarding the rights of sexual minorities, and its role 
as a mass organisation under the leadership of and within the system of 
rule of the Communist Party. By contrast, some NGOs active in this 
policy field can be considered supporters of further democratisation.  
Overall, there is no simple and straightforward answer to the lead-
ing question of this paper, and there is no one type of CO that, without 
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further qualification, can be called a supporter of or an obstacle to fur-
ther democratisation. However, there are indications for the validity of 
the assumption that NGOs in some policy fields already play or at least 
have the potential to play the role of agent of further democratic change. 
Our research confirms that research on COs should not start from 
the assumption that these organisations are supporters of democracy or 
supporters of authoritarian rule. It is more fruitful to see them as “poly-
valent,” as Kößler (1994) once put it, and to analyse their role using a 
relational perspective.
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Appendix
List of Cited Interviews and Dates  
Mass Organisations 
Mass Organisation 3: Headquarter of a Mass Organisation addressing 
women’s rights, gender issues, and family affaires, based in Hanoi, 
12 August 2014 (Mass Organisation 3 a); 27 April 2015 (Mass Or-
ganisation 3 b).  
Professionals’ Organisations 
Professionals’ Organisation 1: An umbrella organisation of businessmen, 
based in Ho Chi Minh City, 11 July 2014; 24 April 2015. 
NGOs
NGO 1: An NGO working in the field of prevention of HIV/Aids and 
care for PLWHIV, based in Ho Chi Minh City, 4 July 2014; 3 April 
2015.  
NGO 2: An NGO working in the field of prevention of and care for 
PLWHIV, based in Ho Chi Minh City, 20 July 2014; 30 March 
2015.  
NGO 4: An NGO working in the field of gender issues, women’s rights 
and family affaires, based in Hanoi, 4 July 2014; 24 April 2015.  
NGO 5: An NGO engaged in the field of gender issues, rights of sexual 
and ethnic minorities, based in Hanoi, 10 February 2015. 
Business Organisations 
Business Organisation 2: Local chapter of a nationwide operating busi-
ness organisation promoting (amongst others) the support of SMEs, 
based in Ho Chi Minh City, 18 June 2014.  
Business Organisation 3: Headquarter of a nationwide operating business 
organisation promoting (amongst others) the support of SMEs 
(Business Organisation 3 a), based in Hanoi, 1 July 2014; legal de-
partment of a nationwide operating business organisation promot-
ing (amongst others) the support of SMEs (Business Organisation 3 
b), based in Hanoi, 4 March 2015; 5 March 2015. 
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Faith-based Organisations 
Faith-based Organisation 1: A shelter for young pregnant women, based 
in Ho Chi Minh City, 17 July 2014. 
 
